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10.1  Introduction 
Housing accounts for one-sixth of  consumption expenditure in the United 
States, second only to food among budget categories. It is also the expenditure 
category that is most directly affected by public policy. The U.S. tax code is 
the most important policy instrument that affects housing. The federal income 
tax subsidizes homeowners by not including imputed rent in the tax base, while 
allowing deductions for mortgage interest payments. There have also been gen- 
erous subsidies to rental housing through accelerated depreciation and other 
tax benefits. 
Public policy also affects the housing sector through a variety of programs 
to support borrowing for home purchase. Targeted low-interest credit initia- 
tives, such as the Federal Housing Administration and the Veterans Adminis- 
tration loan program, permit certain classes of individuals to borrow at below- 
market interest rates. More generally, the entire housing sector has historically 
benefited from federal support of savings and loan institutions and from the 
operation of federal agencies such as the Federal National Mortgage Associa- 
tion, which facilitate smooth operation of a secondary mortgage market. 
Finally, a number  of  federal and state-local programs  assist low-income 
households in finding housing. These include community development grants, 
subsidies to construction of low-income housing, and direct public-sector in- 
tervention to build and operate public housing. Along with food stamps and 
Medicaid, these programs constitute a major source of in-kind assistance to 
the poverty population. 
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US.  public policy toward housing has changed significantly in the last de- 
cade. The tax reforms of 1981 and 1986 reduced the value of tax-exempt im- 
puted income for homeowners and made dramatic changes in the tax incentives 
for rental investment. The prospective subsidy to traditional housing finance 
institutions, notably thrifts, has also changed as a result of the federal rescue 
of  thrift  institutions in the late 1980s. The future therefore portends a U.S. 
policy stance that provides less encouragement  for the housing sector than did 
other policies in recent history. 
This paper describes each of these public policies, noting their current status 
and changes through time, and assesses their effects on the U.S. housing mar- 
ket. The paper is divided into five sections. Section 10.2 presents background 
information on housing markets in the United States, such as the distribution 
of  housing expenditure, the mix  of  owners versus renters in  different age 
groups, and the mortgage status of the U.S. housing stock. Section 10.3 de- 
scribes the tax benefits available to homeowners and notes how these incen- 
tives have  shifted through time. It also discusses the tax subsidies to rental 
housing, noting the controversy surrounding  the links between tax subsidies to 
landlords and  the rents ultimately charged tenants. Section 10.4 describes 
housing programs that operate through financial markets, both targeted mort- 
gage subsidies and more general programs that affect the nature of mortgage 
markets. Section  10.5 discusses housing programs that  target low-income 
households for direct provision of housing services. It provides information on 
the size of the population affected by  these programs, as well as data on the 
level of support provided. There is a brief conclusion. 
10.2  Stylized Facts about the US.  Housing Market 
This section considers the pattern of housing expenditures across different 
household types, the status of households as owners or renters, and the finan- 
cial characteristics  of both new buyers and existing homeowners. 
Table 10.1 reports data on the tenure choice of households in different eco- 
nomic strata. The table reports tabulations from the 1986 Consumer Expendi- 
ture Survey. Households are divided into deciles based on their total expendi- 
tures, with higher outlays indicating  better economic circumstances.' The table 
shows that most households in upper economic strata are owner-occupiers, 
while most lower-strata households are renters. More than 60 percent of the 
households in the lowest expenditure decile are renters, compared with only 
15 percent of those in  the highest outlay category. The bottom third of the 
expenditure distribution contains half of all renter households. 
Table  10.2 shows the age-specific home-ownership rates for U.S. house- 
1. Poterba (1989) argues that consumption provides a more satisfactory basis than annual in- 
come for classifying households. The results in table 10.1 are insensitive, however, to the choice 
of income or expenditure to define the deciles. 241  Public Policy and Housing in the United States 
Table 10.1  Housing Consumption by Expenditure Deciles, 1986 
Average Annual 
Average  Rent (if 
Consumption  Average  Pretax Income  Renters) 



















































Source: Tabulations from the Consumer Expenditure Survey, 1986 (first-quarter expenditure data). 
Table 10.2  Age-Specific Home-ownership Rates, United States, 1988 
Age Category  % Homeowners  Age Category  % Homeowners 
Under 25  15.7  50-54  77.1 
25-29  35.9  55-59  79.3 
30-34  53.2  60-64  79.8 
35-39  63.6  65-69  80.0 
40-44  70.7  10-74  11.7 
45-49  14.4  Over 75  70.8 
Source: Unpublished tabulations from the Current Population Survey 
holds in 1988. There is a sharp increase in home-ownership rates for house- 
holds in their late twenties and early thirties. By age thirty-five, more than half 
of all households own their own homes. For those approaching retirement, the 
home-ownership rate exceeds 80 percent. Venti  and Wise (1989) note that 
home equity constitutes the most important asset for many elderly households. 
The age-specific tenure rates provide important insight on the differential ben- 
efits of subsidies to owners and renters. 
Table 10.3 presents information on changes through time in the ratio of out- 
standing mortgages to the value of the owner-occupied housing stock. At the 
end of the 1980s,  housing debt accounted for nearly half of the value of owner- 
occupied homes. This loan-to-value ratio rose during the 1980s; it was only 
36.6 percent at the end of  1980. Movements in the loan-to-value ratio are 
driven partly by real house price changes and partly by borrowing behavior. In 
the late 1970s, when real house prices rose sharply, the loan-to-value ratio 
declined. During the 1980s,  the rise of home equity mortgages and the stability 242  James M. Poterba 
Table 10.3  Loan-to-Value  Ratios for Owner-Occupied  Housing, 1960-89 (%) 
























Source: Board of Governors of  the Federal Reserve System, Household Net  Worth, December 
1990; Current Population Survey. 
of  house prices coincided with an increase in loan-to-value ratios to record 
levels above 50 percent. 
The average loan-to-value ratio may  differ significantly from the loan-to- 
value ratio on newly purchased homes. Surveys by the Chicago Title Insurance 
Company suggest an average down payment as a fraction of  sales price of 24 
percent in 1988, with smaller down payments (15 percent) by first-time buyers. 
The deductibility provisions for mortgage interest, which now  stand in sharp 
contrast to the nondeductibility of  other types of  consumer debt, are thus a 
critical component of the subsidy to new home buyers. 
The second column in table 10.3 reports the aggregate home-ownership rate. 
The share of the population owning their homes grew from the Second World 
War  until  1980. After peaking at 65.6 percent in  1980, however, the home- 
ownership rate declined during the first half of the 1980s, to below 64  percent 
in 1985. The tenure mix was quite stable in the late 1980s. Because the tenure 
mix  adjusts slowly to varying economic incentives, it may still be premature 
to assess the effects of the decade’s tax reforms on home-ownership rates. 
10.3  Tax Subsidies to Housing Investments 
This section describes the net tax posture toward owner-occupied and rental 
real estate. It contrasts the cost of housing with and without tax subsidies, and 
describes the important consequences of the major tax reforms in the 1980s. 
10.3.1  Owner-Occupied Housing Subsidies 
The single most important subsidy to housing in the United States is the 
federal tax code’s omission of  imputed housing income in defining taxable 
income. To calibrate the impact of tax provisions on the demand for housing, 
it is helpful to define the after-tax user cost of home ownership. This measures 
the marginal cost of an incremental dollar of owner-occupied housing, includ- 
ing the forgone return on the owner’s equity. It is defined as 243  Public Policy and Housing in the United States 
(1)  co = [(l -  0) (i + T~)  + 6 + OL + rn -  IT~IP,, 
where  i is the nominal interest rate, T~ is the property tax rate per dollar of 
property value,’ 0 is the household’s marginal federal income tax rate, 6 is the 
physical decay rate for the property, OL is the risk premium for housing invest- 
ments, rn is the cost of  home maintenance as a fraction of house value,  is 
the expected rate of house price appreciation, and Po  is the real price of owner- 
occupied hou~ing.~  This expression applies only to households who itemize 
for federal income tax purposes. For the nearly half of  all homeowners who 
do not, 0 = 0. 
The user cost of home ownership varies across households. For itemizers, it 
is inversely related to a household’s marginal tax rate. While it reflects the 
marginal cost of  additional housing purchases, it may not reflect the average 
cost, which determines the most cost-effective way  for a given household to 
obtain housing services. For homeowners who would not have itemized in the 
absence of  the property tax and mortgage interest deduction, but do because 
of these items, the marginal cost of housing is given by (1) but the average cost 
depends on the total tax saving. This is 
(2)  Tax Saving = 0(~~  + ip)PoH  -  S, 
where H is the quantity of housing, S is the household’s standard deduction, 
and p is the loan-to-value ratio for the property, For homeowners who do not 
itemize even with their housing-related deductions, the marginal user cost is 
(3)  c,’  = ([(l -  p) (1 -  0) + p]i + T~ + 6 + m -  .rrc}Po. 
Table 10.4 presents evidence on the tax status of U.S. homeowners in  1985, 
prior to the Tax Reform Act, which reduced the probability that homeowners 
would choose to itemize. The number of tax returns with itemized property 
tax deductions was only 57 percent of  the total number of  owner-occupied 
properties. More than 40 percent of  the home-owning population therefore 
faced the nonitemizer user cost for housing. In part, the surprisingly small 
share of homeowners who itemize reflects the substantial number of properties 
without mortgages. Only 57.3 percent of homeowners in 1985 had mortgages; 
this is due to a very high rate of home ownership among elderly households, 
many of  whom have repaid their mortgages. In  1980, the weighted-average 
marginal federal tax rate on mortgage interest deductions was 32 percent. By 
2. Only the part of the property taxes that is not a “benefit tax,” a fee for local public service 
provision, should actually be included in the user cost. 
3. This equation assumes that all capital gains on owner-occupied dwellings are untaxed. Since 
each household is eligible for $125,000 in untaxed lifetime gains, this assumption may not be 
unrealistic. If it were not satisfied, T<  would be replaced with (1 -  7,)~~  where T,  is the effective 
capital gains tax rate.  A more heroic implicit assumption is that the household faces identical 
borrowing and lending rates. Further discussion of these assumptions and information on plausible 
parameter values for the components of equation (1) may be found in Poterba (1984). 244  James M. Poterba 
Table 10.4  Itemization Status of U.S. Homeowners, 1985 
Millions  Percentage 
Number of homeowners  56.2 
Number of tax returns with mortgage deduction  28.1  50.0 
Number of tax returns with real estate tax deduction  57.1 
Number of homeowners with mortgages  32.2  57.3 
32.1 
Source: Rows 1 and 2 are from US.  Bureau of the Census, Housing in America 1985/86,  Current 
Housing Report H-121, no.  19. Tax  information is drawn from the 1985 Statistics of  Income: 
Individual Income Tax Returns. 
1984, when the rate reductions of  1981 had taken full effect, this average tax 
rate was 28 percent! 
The user cost summarizes the tax code’s influence on housing costs. To  de- 
fine the subsidy, however, it is useful to compute the user cost that would obtain 
if imputed income from owner-occupied housing were taxed but deductions 
for mortgage interest and property taxes were still allowed, and depreciation 
and maintenance expenses became deductable: 
(4)  Cot =  [i + T~ + 6 + m + a -  ~r,3P,. 
Table 10.5 reports the user cost of home ownership for households at three 
income levels at various times during the last decade. It presents both the user 
cost under the prevailing tax rules and the hypothetical user cost if  the tax 
system did not provide a subsidy. The first panel considers the user cost for a 
fixed pattern of  interest and expected inflation rates, thereby identifying the 
effect of tax changes. The second panel evaluates the tax code of several se- 
lected years since 1980, using interest and expected inflation rates that pre- 
vailed at that time, thus indicating  the net change in incentives for home owner- 
ship.5  Other auxiliary parameters, such as the property tax rate and the cost of 
maintaining the home, are assumed constant throughout the calculations. 
The results illustrate that recent reforms had their most pronounced effect 
on the cost of home ownership for high-income households. For a family with 
adjusted gross income (AGI) of $250,000  in 1988, the Tax Reform Act of 1986 
lowered the marginal tax rate from .50 to .28 and raised the user cost of home 
ownership from .094 to .114, assuming the base case with an interest rate of 7 
percent and 3 percent expected inflation rate.6 The actual change in the user 
4. These estimates are based on data reported in IRS  (1980, 1984). 
5. The first set of user cost changes reflects the effects of  tax reform but in a counterfactual 
setting, while the second convolutes the effects of tax changes with the effects of other shocks, 
for example changes in monetary policy, that are unrelated to the tax system. A more complete 
analysis would involve general equilibrium analysis of tax policy, in particular with an endogenous 
real interest rate. 
6. The reform would have to lower real interest rates by nearly three hundred basis points to 
offset the lost value of tax deductions. 245  Public Policy and Housing in the United States 
Table 10.5  User Costs of Owner-Occupied Property, 1980-88 
1980  1982  1984  1986  1988 
~ 
Case 1: Fixed parameters i = .07,  me = .03 
1988 AGI = $25,000  .120  ,122  .125 
1988 AGI = $45,000  ,110  .113  .117 
1988 AGI = $250,000  .08 1  ,094  .094 
No-tax case  .129  ,129  ,129 
User cost of home ownership 
Case 2: Prevailing interest and injution rate 
User cost of home ownership 
1988 AGI = $25,000  ,080  .094  ,098 
1988 AGI = $45,000  .064  .077  .089 
1988 AGI = $250,000  ,017  ,042  .049 
No-tax case  ,141  ,157  ,151 
Parameter values 
Nominal rate  ,127  ,151  ,124 



















.09  1 
.034 
Notes: Calculations for both cases assume T~  = .02, 6 = .014, Q = .04,  and  rn = .025. AGI = 
adjusted gross income. 
cost of home ownership since 1986, recognizing variations in interest rates and 
inflationary expectations, is from .074 to .095 for this household. Assuming a 
price elasticity of  demand of -  1  .O  for owner-occupied housing?  this  tax 
change could have large effects on both demand and house prices. 
The post- 1986 change in user costs for high-income households, however, 
is small relative to the change from the beginning of the 1980s, when the esti- 
mated user cost was .017. The large change in the early 1980s is due to rising 
real interest rates, falling inflation rates, which raised the after-tax cost of bor- 
rowing because the tax system is not indexed, and declining marginal tax rates. 
The effect of rate reductions on home-ownership incentives for those in lower 
income brackets is much smaller, since the decline in tax rates in  the 1986 
reform was less pronounced. For the household with AGI of $25,000 in 1988, 
the tax reform lowered the marginal tax rate from 16 percent to 15 percent and 
raised the user cost (in the benchmark case) from .125 to .126. Some middle- 
income households, such as the $45,000 example presented here, even experi- 
enced increases in their marginal tax rates, and for them housing costs in- 
creased. 
The 1986 tax reform also raised the standard deduction, reducing the frac- 
tion of  the population who would itemize if  they were not homeowners and 
raising the average cost of home ownership. For a joint filer, the standard de- 
duction rose from $3,670 to $5,000. Higher standard deductions reduce the 
7. Rosen (1986) and Olsen (1987) survey the voluminous housing demand literature. 246  James M. Poterba 
incentive for a household to own, but conditional on deciding to own, they do 
not affect the marginal cost of additional housing services. 
In  both panels of  table  10.5, the last row indicates the user cost of  home 
ownership, assuming no tax distortions. For the case of a fixed inflation and 
interest rate, in the upper panel, the costs in all years and for all households 
would be ,129. This implies that the tax code in 1980 reduced the user cost by 
14 percent for middle-income ($45,000)  households and by 12  percent for the 
same households in 1988. At the very high income levels, however, the subsidy 
is much larger. The user cost was 37 percent below  the no-tax level for the 
$250,000 household in  1980, but only  12 percent below  the  no-tax  cost in 
1988. Again using a price elasticity of demand of -  1  .O for housing services, 
these values imply at least a 10  percent increase in the owner-occupied housing 
stock as a result of the tax subsidies.* 
10.3.2  Tax Subsidies to Rental Property 
The tax system is also a critical determinant of the net incentives for rental 
housing investment. In analyzing the tax subsidies to rental housing, there are 
virtually no tax benefits to renters but substantial tax benefits directed at rental 
landlords. The summary statistic for policy incentives toward rental property 
is therefore the landlord’s user cost of rental housing. This is defined as 
where the parameters not defined above are T,  the marginal income tax rate of 
the rental landlord; Pr,  the real price of rental property; and z, the present value 
of tax depreciation  allowance^.^ In equilibrium, the rent charged must equal cr 
so that the landlord is willing to hold the rental property. 
The tax incentives with respect to owner occupation for a given household 
are straightforward to measure, since they depend on that household’s tax pa- 
rameters. The tax subsidies to rental housing are more complex, because they 
depend on the tax rates of the “marginal rental landlord” whose tax parameters 
determine the marketwide rental rate. There is disagreement on the identity of 
the marginal rental landlord; this translates into uncertainty about the parame- 
ter  T  in the user cost expression. Some studies, such as Titman  (1982) and 
Scholes, Terry, and Wolfson (1989), assume that the landlord is a top-bracket 
individual  investor. Such an investor receives maximum advantage from the 
depreciation allowances  on rental property,  since these allowances generate 
deductions, which reduce taxable income. If the marginal supplier of funds to 
the rental industry is in a lower tax bracket, however, this will reduce the value 
8. Part of  the tax subsidy to owner-occupied housing will be reflected in higher land values, 
thus blunting the subsidy effects described here. 
9. Equation (5)  treats the government as sharing the risk associated with rental investments, an 
assumption that may be incorrect. If the government is not a partner to such risk, the a  term would 
no longer be multiplied by  (1 -  v)/(  1 -  7). 247  Public Policy and Housing in the United States 
Table 10.6  Depreciation Provisions for Residential Structures, 1969-88 
Lifetime (years)  Depreciation Schedule 
1969-8 1  32  150% declining balance 
1981-84  15  175% declining balance 
1984-85  18  175% declining balance 
1985-86  19  175% declining balance 
1986-  21.5  Straight line 
Source: Author’s compilation, based on U.S. Internal Revenue Code 
of these deductions and therefore raise equilibrium rents.Io Particularly when 
the dispersion of marginal tax rates is large, as it was prior to the 1981 tax 
reform, assumptions about the identity of the marginal landlord significantly 
affect estimated user costs. 
Tax depreciation benefits are a critical part of the net subsidy to rental hous- 
ing. Table 10.6 shows the recent history of depreciation policy for rental prop- 
erty, The 1981 Economic Recovery Tax Act (ERTA) shortened the tax lifetime 
for residential rental property from 32 to 15 years.” The 1986 Tax Reform Act 
reversed this policy, extending the lifetime to 27.5 years and requiring straight- 
line depreciation rather than more accelerated 175 percent declining balance. 
The reduction in marginal tax rates in 1981 partly counteracted the expanded 
depreciation benefits in the ERTA, but in 1986 less generous depreciation rules 
combined with lower marginal tax rates to significantly reduce the value of 
depreciation benefits. Since the present value of depreciation tax benefits is a 
key consideration in rental investment decisions, real rents should increase be- 
cause of the 1986 Tax Reform Act.12 
The net incentive to invest in rental property is also affected by a variety of 
other tax code provisions, notably the capital gains tax rate and the tax rules 
designed to curb investment in tax shelters. A substantial fraction of the returns 
to property investment accrue as capital gains, so the tax reform in 1986 which 
raised the capital gains rate was unfavorable for rental housing. In  addition, 
the Tax Reform Act of  1986 included several provisions designed to restrict 
10. Gravelle (1985) argues that corporations, not individuals, are the marginal suppliers of capi- 
tal to the rental housing industry. Poterba (1987) reports that corporations held only 4.5 percent of 
residential rental property in 1985, compared with 38.6 percent for partnerships and sole proprie- 
torships, which are taxed at individual rates. The relative unimportance of corporate investors casts 
doubt on the view that they are price-setters in this market. 
11. Hendershott  (1987) discusses in detail the changes in depreciation provisions and  their 
likely effects. 
12. The measurement of the present discounted value of depreciation allowances is complicated 
because buildings may be depreciated more than once. Particularly during inflationary periods 
when there are substantial gains to selling a building and redepreciating  its increased nominal 
basis, investors may “churn” their properties. This can substantially increase the present value of 
depreciation allowances for investors in rental property, lowering the user cost and the equilibrium 
rent demanded by  landlords. Gordon, Hines, and Summers (1987) discuss this possibility. 248  James M. Poterba 
Table 10.7  Rental User Costs, 1980-88 
Economic Assumptions  1980  1982  1984  1986  1988 
i = .07, T,  = .03  ,126“  .116  .117  .I18  ,132 
Actual economic conditions  ,059  .096  ,104  ,137  ,149 
Note: Rental user costs assume no churning, with marginal tax rates for the rental landlord of SO 
in 1980-86  and .28 in  1988. See table 10.5 for definition of “actual economic conditions.” 
This entry is notable because it does not assume the highest possible marginal tax rate for the 
rental landlord; it assumes a 50 percent rather than a 70 percent marginal rate. At the 70 percent 
rate, this value would be ,117. 
tax shelter investments, including investments in real estate. New limitations 
on using tax shelter losses to offset other types of income discouraged high- 
leverage rental projects, because the interest deductions in these projects were 
no longer as valuable to their investors. In part as a result of these provisions, 
there was a 37 percent real decline in real estate partnership sales between 
1985 and 1988. 
Table  10.7 reports estimates of  the user cost of  rental housing at several 
dates during the last decade. Assuming that the marginal supplier of  rental 
units was an  individual in the top marginal tax bracket, the rental user cost rose 
from .137 to .149, or 9 percent, between 1986 and 1988. The increase would 
have been larger if  the real interest rate had not declined during this period. 
The change in user costs in the early 1980s is smaller. If the nominal interest 
rate and expected inflation rate had been at their 1980 levels in  1982, rental 
user costs would have declined from .096 (assuming a landlord tax rate of 50 
percent in  1980) to .089, or by 7.3 percent. The increase in real interest rates 
between 1980  and 1982, however, counteracted  this effect, so the reported user 
costs in table 10.7 show virtually no change.I3 
The results for rental user costs during the late 1980s are sensitive to differ- 
ent assumptions about the “marginal investors” in rental properties. If corpora- 
tions are the marginal suppliers of rental housing, for example, then the ad- 
verse effects of the 1986 Tax Reform Act on real rents would be much smaller. 
Corporate investors face smaller reductions in marginal tax rates and are less 
affected by passive loss limits, than are individual investors. 
It is essential to recognize the partial-equilibrium nature of  the foregoing 
calculations. The net incentive for investing in housing capitals depends not 
only on the tax treatment of housing, but on the relative tax burdens on housing 
and other assets. Housing had historically been a lightly taxed asset, and the 
13. If the marginal investor in rental property in  1980 was in the 70 percent tax bracket, then 
the net change from 1980 to  1982 is an  increase in rental user costs, since the reduction in the 
landlord’s tax rate outweighs the increasingly generous depreciation provisions. 249  Public Policy and Housing in the United States 
1986 reform raised the tax burden on corporate assets. Thus the present policy 
regime provides substantial net subsidies to housing. 
10.4  Policies Affecting Financial Markets 
A second set of policies that affect housing markets operates through credit 
markets. There are three important sets of  policies in  this regard. The first 
are mortgage guarantees, which are designed to provide housing assistance to 
households purchasing particular types of homes. The second are subsidies to 
the institutions that facilitate the secondary market for mortgages, enabling 
capital to flow to housing lenders. The third set of subsidies are benefits, now 
largely of historical interest, to the lenders such as thrift institutions who typi- 
cally provided mortgage finance. This section considers each type of subsidy 
in turn. 
10.4.1  Targeted Mortgage Assistance 
There are three significant federal mortgage subsidy programs, operated by 
the Federal Housing Administration (FHA), the Veterans Administration (VA), 
and the Farmers Home Administration. The FHA is the largest program. It 
began in 1934, with the passage of the National Housing Act, in an effort to 
reduce volatility in the housing industry and to improve housing affordability. 
The FHA provided insurance on loans with higher loan-to-value ratios than 
conventional lenders, and offered longer-term loans than had been commonly 
available. Before the FHA, the primary mortgage on most homes had a matu- 
rity of five years or less (Wiedemer 1990, 124); the FHA popularized twenty- 
year level-payment mortgages. 
The principal benefit of an FHA-insured mortgage, from the home buyer’s 
perspective, is that it provides mortgage credit on more favorable terms than 
the private market would provide. In some cases, the FHA insurance may en- 
able borrowers who would otherwise have been denied mortgage credit to ob- 
tain a loan. FHA provisions also enable many households to borrow with a 
smaller down payment than lenders typically require. 
There are limits on the dollar value of the mortgages that can receive FHA 
assistance. In 1988, the maximum permissible loan was $101,250, compared 
with a median new  home price of  $112,500. The upper bound on the loan 
value as a share of the purchase price (including some costs of  the housing 
transaction) for existing houses is 97 percent of the first $25,000, plus 95 per- 
cent of the value above $25,000. For new houses, the limit is 90 percent of the 
purchase price. Particularly for existing homes, the limits are higher than many 
commercial lenders would permit, thereby enhancing access to home owner- 
ship. Since 1982, there have been no limits on the interest rates that lenders 
can charge on FHA loans. 
The program described above is the FHA section 203(b) program, which is 
the largest FHA initiative to provide mortgage financing. The VA  and Farmers 250  James M. Poterba 
Table 10.8  Volume of Guaranteed Mortgage Originations, 1978-89  (%) 

















































Source: National Association of Home Builders, The Current Housing Situation, December 1990. 
Home Administration programs are similar in character to those at the FHA. 
In the last decade, FHA has also broadened its activities to allow graduated 
payment mortgages and a variety of other new mortgage designs, all directed 
at encouraging broader participation in owner-occupied housing. 
In  1989, the FHA, Farmers Home Administration, and VA  insured approxi- 
mately one-quarter of all new  mortgage^.'^ With the exception of just under 10 
percent of  home buyers who pay cash for their houses, the remaining mort- 
gages are conventional loans. Table  10.8 reports the relative importance of 
FHA and VA  mortgages as a share of all new mortgage doZZur  originations. 
These loans accounted for only  13 percent of  the total in  1989; they are a 
smaller share of value than number of  loans because they tend to be smaller 
loans than conventional financings. The table also shows that federally insured 
loans have become a less important part of the total mortgage pool over time. 
In 1980, these loans were more than 20 percent of all new mortgage debt. The 
decline is apparently the result of  house prices rising more rapidly than FHA 
loan limits, making the houses that can be financed by FHA a smaller share of 
the total stock. This is consistent with the stated goals of housing policy in the 
1980s, discussed for example in Struyk, Mayer, and Tuccillo (1983), of reduc- 
ing transfer programs to the middle class. 
10.4.2  Mortgage Market Support 
The second component of federal support for the mortgage market operates 
through the securitization process, the process by which individual mortgages 
are repackaged into “mortgage-backed securities” and then sold to secondary 
14. Data are drawn from the National Association of Homebuilders, The Current  Housing Sirua- 
tion, December 1990. 251  Public Policy and Housing in the United States 
market investors. Until the early 1970s, regulated thrift institutions were the 
principal source of funds for home mortgages lending. These financial inter- 
mediaries benefited from regulatory limits on the interest rates that could be 
paid at their competitor commercial banks. With a virtually assured supply of 
saving at low interest rates, thrifts were able to supply mortgage loans at rea- 
sonable rates. The federal insurance on deposits at thrifts was a partial compen- 
sation to depositors for the regulated rates of return. Even before the 1970s, 
FHA and VA  loans had been sold to secondary market buyers. This was pos- 
sible because these loans were relatively homogeneous, and because the pres- 
ence of federal guarantees made them riskless investments, appealing to a wide 
range of investors. 
The emergence of an active secondary market for non-FHA mortgages was 
the result of initiatives by the Federal National Mortgage Association (FNMA) 
in the early 1970s. The FNMA and Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation 
(FHLMC, a new institution created in 1970)  together established industry stan- 
dards with respect to documentation and credit qualification, which ultimately 
permitted rapid expansion of the secondary mortgage market. Neither of these 
organizations have federal guarantees behind their borrowing; they are quasi- 
governmental agencies, and while many investors expect that default is impos- 
sible because the federal government would intervene to prevent it, this is not 
a legal promise. Today  conventional mortgages are repackaged by  FNMA, 
FHLMC, and a variety of other financial intermediaries. Many investors who 
would not hold particular mortgages are active participants in the secondary 
mortgage markets, and funnel capital to the housing sector. 
Assessing the effect of public policy on the securitization process, and ulti- 
mately on housing markets, is difficult. Hendershott and Van  Order (1989) 
analyze the effect  of  integration of  the  non-FHA  mortgage markets with 
broader capital markets. They conclude that the rise of pass-through securities 
backed by mortgages has reduced the volatility of new residential construction, 
but not altered the average level of new construction very much. 
10.4.3  Federal Subsidies to the Thrift Industry 
A final set of  institutions, which have had important influence historically 
but are of shrinking importance prospectively, are government subsidies to sav- 
ings and loans. These financial intermediaries benefited from federal deposit 
guarantees and were able to attract funds at lower rates than the riskiness of 
their investments should have allowed. Until 1980, federal regulation of inter- 
est rates that could be paid by the important competitors to these institutions 
ensured their supply of funds. Financial deregulation, combined with the high 
nominal interest rates of the early 1980s and the depressed real estate market 
in some regions in the late 1980s, removed thrifts as central actors in the hous- 
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Corporation was closing thrifts at which the value of  deposit insurance was 
especially large (i.e., those with very weak financial positions), and the share 
of mortgage financing accounted for by  thrift institutions was shrinking. Nev- 
ertheless, the system of regulated deposit rates and deposit insurance undoubt- 
edly contributed to some increase in the U.S. residential capital stock. 
10.5  Targeted Housing Subsidies: Public Housing 
A final dimension of public policy toward housing is the montage of income 
support and in-kind transfer programs designed to provide housing to low- 
income households. There are two types of  public housing programs: those 
that target construction of housing units for low-income households (project- 
based aid), and those that provide support to households and allow them to 
choose their own units (household-based aid). During the last decade, federal 
policy has shifted toward providing household-based support. 
The two most important project-based aid programs are the public housing 
program and the section 8 new construction program. Public housing funds 
support the construction of multifamily dwellings targeted at the low-income 
population. These projects are usually managed by  the local governments, 
which  operate  the  units  when  they  are completed. These  programs  were 
sharply curtailed in the early 1980s since they did not involve market-based 
determination of resource allocation, a principle that the Reagan administra- 
tion sought to introduce to all aspects of transfer policy. These reductions con- 
tinued a trend away from project aid that began a decade earlier, with concern 
that public housing projects were of low quality and had some proclivity to- 
ward becoming ghettos. 
Table  10.9 presents information on the importance of  public housing pro- 
grams at the height of  their utilization, at the beginning of  the 1980s. Most 
public housing was built in urban areas, so the table focuses on the share of 
the housing stock in major U.S. cities that was accounted for by public units. 
In many of the largest metropolitan areas, public housing accounted for more 
than 5 percent of  all rental units. The share of  public housing has declined 
during the subsequent decade. 
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Table 10.10  Public Housing Starts and Other Housing Starts, 1977-88  (in 
thousands) 
Public Housing  Total starts 
starts  (public + private) 
1977  14.6  2001.7 
1978  15.8  2036.1 
1979  14.8  1760.0 
1980  20.4  1312.6 
1981  16.1  1100.3 
1982  9.8  1072.0 
1983  9.4  1712.5 
1984  6.3  1755.8 
1985  3.1  1745.0 
1986  1.7  1807.1 
1987  2.2  1622.7 
Source: U.S. Department of  Commerce, Construction Review,  various issues. 
Table 10.10 shows the trajectory of public housing starts during the last de- 
cade. In the late 1970s and early 1980s,  public housing starts averaged between 
1 and 2 percent of all new housing starts in the United States. By the second 
half of  the 1980s, however,  they  had  declined to a trivial flow of  new  con- 
struction. 
The program that expanded as public housing contracted was the section 8 
new construction program. In this program, a private developer who is under- 
taking new construction receives a federal commitment that, in return for hous- 
ing low-income households, the government will insure rental payments for 
some period (typically twenty years). The low-income recipients of section 8 
assistance may not spend more than 30 percent of their income on housing, 
and the federal government pays the difference between that amount and each 
unit’s contract rent. Developers building low-income units can also avail them- 
selves of  favorable financing opportunities, for example, by  financing their 
project with federally insured Government National Mortgage Associations 
(GNMA) loans. A developer who plans to significantly renovate an existing 
property can qualify for the same guarantee. 
The second category of public housing aid programs, household-based pro- 
grams, provide support for particular individuals or households and typically 
supplement their rental payments to avoid excessively high shares of income 
being spent on housing. The single most important program in this dimension 
is section 8 housing assistance. After a household qualifies for a section 8 cer- 
tificate, it is free to select any rental unit that rents for less than the “fair market 
rent” specified by  the section 8 program. The federal government then pays 
the difference between rental costs and the household’s estimated rent-paying 
capacity. In a variation on  this program, the household receives a housing 
voucher and faces no limits on subsequent outlays. The voucher is treated just 
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spend more than fair market rent but would bear the full marginal cost of 
such outlays. 
To  illustrate the changing composition of public housing programs in the 
United States, it is useful to compare the programs in  1978 and 1988. Table 
10.11 provides data on the basic structure of  housing assistance. In  1977, of 
3.163 million households receiving assistance, 2.092 million were renters. 
Within this group, 1.825 million were receiving benefits that resulted from new 
federally supported construction (public housing), while  only  268,000 re- 
ceived support for finding their own units in the standard market. 
By  1988, the pattern had shifted radically. Of  4.296 million renter house- 
holds receiving assistance, nearly one-third were receiving assistance to ac- 
quire housing units in the open market. While the number of  assisted renter 
households rose sharply during the decade, the number of assisted homeown- 
ers remained stable at 1.082 million in 1978, and 1.059 million in 1988. 
Total federal outlays for housing programs are noted in table 10.12, which 
shows the decline in federal commitment to this area. The table reports budget 
authoriq, which includes all projected outlays in multiyear building commit- 
ments. One important feature of U.S.  housing policy during the 1980s has been 
a shift from long-term federal commitments to shorter projects, leading to 
smaller budget authorization for a given number of  households served. The 
result is that average annual outlays throughout most of  the  1980s remained 
higher than in previous decades, in spite of falling budget authority. 
The 1980s witnessed an important refocusing of  U.S. housing assistance 
policy. Programs were targeted more precisely toward low-income households, 
to the exclusion of lower-middle-income households who received benefits in 
Table 10.11  Households Receiving Federal Housing Aid, 1977-88 (in thousands) 
Net New  Households Receiving 
Commitments  Assistance 





























































Source: US.  House Ways  and Means Committee, Background Material  and Data on Programs 
within the Jurisdiction of the House Ways and Means Committee (1989), 1157-58. 255  Public Policy and Housing in the United States 
Table 10.12  Federal Appropriations for Housing Assistance, 1977-88  (in millions 
of 1987 dollars) 
1977  50.3  1983  11.5 
1978  52.9  1984  12.7 
1979  38.0  1985  12.0 
1980  38.2  1986  10.3 
1981  32.9  1987  9.0 
1982  17.4  1988  8.8 
Source: US.  House Ways and Means Committee, Background Material  and Data on  Programs 
within the Jurisdiction of  the House Ways and Means Committee (1989), 1157-58. 
prior decades. The strategy of public provision of housing services, which had 
been the basis for housing policy in the 1960s and  1970s, was largely aban- 
doned and replaced by  a variety of  transfer programs that take advantage of 
market mechanisms to deliver housing assistance. Government programs re- 
main an important influence on the quality and affordability of  housing for 
low-income households. 
10.6  Conclusions 
Public policy toward housing has undergone radical changes in the United 
States during the last decade. Until the early 1980s, the tax  system treated 
housing more generously than other assets, credit institutions that supplied 
mortgage financing received public subsidies not available to other financial 
institutions, and all levels of government were active participants in building 
and subsidizing housing units for low-income households. The net effect of 
these subsidies was a strong incentive for housing capital accumulation. With 
these policies in place, the home-ownership rate in the United States rose for 
nearly four decades after World War  11,  and housing capital became a larger 
share of the nation’s tangible asset stock. 
A variety of policy changes during the 1980s weakened the policy bias to- 
ward housing. The net effect of the tax reforms in 1981 and 1986 was a reduc- 
tion in the tax incentives for rental housing construction, and some diminution 
of owner-occupied housing’s tax-favored status in comparison to other invest- 
ments. Deregulation of financial institutions, notably removal of  interest-rate 
restrictions  on  competitors  to  saving  and  loan  institutions  and  evolving 
changes in deposit insurance, has reduced the supply of  saving to housing- 
oriented institutions and integrated the housing finance market with other parts 
of  the capital market. At the same time, federal budgetary pressures led to 
cutbacks in direct federal housing programs, with limited prospects for future 
expansion. These changes have  reduced the prohousing bias of  U.S. public 
housing policy, although they have not eliminated it. 256  James M. Poterba 
References 
Gordon, Roger H., James R. Hines, and Lawrence H. Summers. 1987. Notes on the Tax 
Treatment of  Structures. In M.  Feldstein, ed., The Esfects of  Taxation on Capital 
Formation. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Gravelle, Jane G. 1985. U.S. Tax Policy and Rental Housing: An Economic Analysis. 
Congressional Research Service, working paper. 
Hendershott, Patric H. 1987. Tax Changes and Capital Allocation in the 1980s. In M. 
Feldstein, ed., The Effects of Taxation on Capital Formation. Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press. 
Hendershott, Patric H., and Robert Van Order. 1989. Integration of Mortgage and Capi- 
tal Markets and the Accumulation of Residential Capital. Regional Science and Ur- 
ban Economics 19:188-210. 
Olsen, Edgar 0. 1987. The Demand and Supply of Housing Service: A Critical Survey 
of the Empirical Literature. In Edwin S.  Mills, ed., Handbook of Regional and Urban 
Economics, vol. 2.  Amsterdam: North-Holland. 
Poterba, James M. 1984. Tax Subsidies to Owner-Occupied Housing: An Asset-Market 
Approach. Quarterly Journal of Economics 99: 729-52. 
. 1987. Tax Reform and Residential Investment Incentives. In Proceedings  of 
the National Tar Association-Tax Institute of America, 112-19.  May. 
. 1989.  Lifetime Incidence and the Distributional Burden of Excise Taxes. Amer- 
ican Economic Review 79 (May): 325-30. 
Rosen, Harvey S. 1986. Housing Subsidies: Effects on Housing Decisions, Efficiency, 
and Equity. In M. Feldstein and A. Auerbach, eds., Handbook of Public Economics, 
1  :375-420.  (Amsterdam: North-Holland). 
Scholes, Myron, Eric Terry, and Mark Wolfson. 1989. Tax Policy in a Complex and 
Dynamic Economic Environment: Challenges and Opportunities. Mimeo. Stanford 
University. 
Struyk, Raymond J.  1980. A New System for Public Housing: Salvaging  a National 
Resource. Washington, DC: Urban Institute Press. 
Struyk, Raymond J., Neil Mayer, and John Tucillo. 1983. Rental Housing in the 1980s. 
Washington, DC: Urban Institute. 
Titman, Sheridan. 1982. The Effects of Anticipated Inflation on Housing Market Equi- 
librium. Journal of Finance 37327-42. 
U.S.  Treasury. Internal Revenue Service. 1980. Statistics of income: Individual Income 
Tax Returns, 1980. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office. 
. 1984. Statistics of Income: Individual income Tax Returns, 1984. Washington, 
DC: U.S. Government Printing Office. 
Venti, Steven, and David Wise. 1989. Aging, Moving, and Housing Wealth. In David 
Wise, ed., The Economics of Aging. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Wiedemer, John P.  1990.  Real Estate Finance. 6th edition. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Pren- 
tice Hall. 